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Formalism in American Contract Law: Classical and Con-

temporary
Mark L. Movsesian
Hofstra University
It is a truth universally acknowledged, that we live
in a formalist era. 1 At least when it comes to American contract law. 2 Much more than the jurisprudence
of a generation ago, today's cutting-edge work in
American contract scholarship values the formalist
virtues of bright-line rules, objective interpretation,
and party autonomy. Policing bargains for substantive fairness seems more and more an outdated notion. Courts, it is thought, should refrain from interfering with market exchanges. Private arbitration has
displaced courts in the context of many traditional
contract disputes. Even adhesion contracts find their
defenders, much to the chagrin of communitarian
Substantial excerpts of this talk, presented at the 2005 EACLE Symposium
on "Agreements" at Ghent University, are taken from my previously published
work on American contracts scholar Samuel Williston. Mark L. Movsesian,
Rediscovering Williston, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207 (2005). 1 thank John
McGinnis and Brian Tamanaha for careful readings of earlier drafts and the
participants in the EACLE Symposium and a workshop at St. John's University School of Law for helpful comments.
2 See, e.g., David Chamy, The New Formalism in Contract,66 U. CHI. L. REV.
842, 842 (1999); Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract
Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (1995).
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scholars.
This is not the first formalist era in American contract law. For about 60 years after 1870, the American academy was dominated by what has come to be
known as classical jurisprudence. 3 The classicists
were formalists, too. They argued in favor of objectivity and predictability and relatively free markets.
Indeed, the story of their overthrow by the Progressives and Realists in the middle part of the twentieth
century, a story told memorably by Grant Gilmore in
The Death of Contract and The Ages of American
Law, is in many ways the rand narrative of American contract jurisprudence. It would be entirely understandable for contemporary formalists to view
themselves as a kind of Restoration.
Yet New Formalists--the designation became popular in the 1990s--don't really see things that way.
New Formalists reject classical contract jurisprudence
as outmoded. They dismiss the essentialism of the
classicists, preferring arguments about efficiency and
pragmatism to conceptual analysis. They reject the
classical belief in the ineluctability of legal rules; for
New Formalists, legal rules have only presumptive
force. Their commitment to the free market is less
3Recent years have seen a surge of interest in classical jurisprudence. For good

examples, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 964 (1995); Thomas C. Grey, JudicialReview and Legal Pragmatism, 38 WAKE
4FOREST L. REV. 473, 497-507 (2003).

See Mark L. Movscsian, Book Review, Two Cheers ForFreedom of Contract,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1529, 1529-31 (2002).
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conceptual. Finally, New Formalists denigrate the
under-theorized nature of classical jurisprudence.
New Formalist scholarship does not focus on doctrine
and does not rely on the intuitive justifications of
lawyers and judges. Rather, it seeks to explain contract law with the tools of social science: economics
and statistics.
In reality, the differences between classical and
contemporary formalism are less pronounced than
New Formalists believe. Some versions of classical
jurisprudence might fit the image New Formalists
have of it; the work of Langdell, perhaps, comes
close to the caricature. But some classical jurisprudence does not. Using the work of an important classical contract scholar, Samuel Williston, I will show
that at least one influential version of classical formalism also valued pragmatism. Williston was not an
essentialist. He held that legal rules were presumptive, to be disregarded where important real-world
values counseled a different result. Moreover, Williston did not support freedom of contract with the ideological fervor we sometimes attribute to him.
Nonetheless, there is an important way in which
classical formalism did differ from the contemporary
version. Compared to New Formalism, classical
scholarship was unfortunately under-theorized. Classicists like Williston did indeed rely on the sort of
commonsense explanations that lawyers and judges
use in their daily work. Given what they were at-
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tempting to do, their lack of interest in theory is understandable. Unlike today's legal academics, classicists did not see themselves primarily as members of
the university world. They thought of themselves
primarily as lawyers and they directed their scholarship primarily towards the profession. More than anything else, the difference between classical and contemporary formalism can be explained by the changing self-image of the American legal academy.
Before explaining the unappreciated similarities between classical and contemporary formalism, it is
necessary to consider the purported differences. In
the conventional account, New Formalism differs
from the classical version in four important and related ways. First, New Formalism rejects the essentialism of classical contract law. Classicism maintained that "contract" was a concept with an essence,
an irreducible descriptive and normative core. 5 Contract law was a set of axioms that followed from a
true understanding of that essence, and a set of rules
that followed from the axioms. 6 Classical contract
law drew its justification from its supposed conformity with a proper understanding of contract as a
concept, without regard to the practical effect con5

See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 48-

49 (1983); cf BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THE

STRUGGLE OF OUR AGE chs. 3, 4 (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript on file with
author) (discussing "conceptual formalism" and distinguishing it from "rule
6formalism").
See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88
CAL. L. REv. 1743, 1751 (2000).
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7
tract law had in terms of efficiency or other values.

To make this discussion more concrete, consider
the famous example (at least to Americans) of Langdell's treatment of the "mailbox rule." Under the
mailbox rule, acceptance of an offer made by correspondence is effective immediately upon dispatch--at
the moment the offeree puts the acceptance out of his
or her control--even if the offeror has not yet received
it.8 The rule is one of the foundational principles of
American contract law, learned by thousands of firstyear law students in the United States every year.
Christopher C. Langdell, one of the most prominent
classicists (and dean of the Harvard Law School) rejected this rule. 9 To him, the essence of contract lay
in the concept of promise, and the essence of promise
lay in communication to the promisee. A promise that
the promisee had not received was, by definition, not
a promise at all; thus, acceptance could take effect
only upon receipt by the offeror.10 Langdell recognized that there might be practical arguments for the
mailbox rule. He noted that judges had "claimed that
purposes of substantial justice, and the interests of
contracting parties as understood by themselves,
7See id.at 1750 (explaining that classical contract law maintained that fundamental doctrines were self-evident and allowed "no room" for "justifying
doctrinal propositions on the basis of moral and policy propositions").
8See E.ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.22 (3d ed. 1999).
9
See C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 15 (2d ed.
1880).
"°See Grey, supra note 5, at 4 (discussing Langdell's views regarding the mailbox rule).
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[would] be best served by holding that the contract is
complete the moment the letter of acceptance is
mailed," and that some had posed cases showing that
Langdell's approach "would produce not only unjust
but absurd results." ' For an essentialist like Langdell, though, these practical arguments were "irrelevant." 12 Once one understood the true nature of a
promise, nothing else could matter.
New Formalists disdain this sort of essentialism.
They advocate formalism, not because it coheres with
abstract concepts like "contract" and "promise," but
because it advances important pragmatic values like
certainty, stability, and efficiency.' 3 For example,
Lisa Bernstein writes that formalist adjudication by
private arbitral regimes benefits contracting parties
by promoting clarity and predictability. 14 A comprehensive set of bright-line rules, she argues, reduces
transaction costs and makes misunderstandings less
likely. Moreover, if disputes do arise, a formalist approach improves the chances of settlement "by making arbitral outcomes relatively predictable."' 5 SimiI"LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 20-21.
21d. at 21. Langdell did go on to demonstrate that, assuming practical arguments
were relevant, he could muster some in favor of his own position. Id.
3
1 See Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism 4, 28-29,
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstractid=200732 (Sept. 6, 1999) (discussing the pragmatic nature of the new formalism).
"See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Lav in the Cotton Industry:
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1724, 1735-44 (2001) (describing and discussing advantages of formalist
approach of cotton industry arbitration tribunals).
Id at 1742.
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larly, Schwartz and Scott advocate formalist interpretation of certain business contracts, at least as a default position, as a means of promoting efficiency. 16
They believe that a plain-meaning approach, coupled
with a "hard" version of the parol evidence rule and
strict enforcement of merger clauses, best suits the
presumed goals of contracting parties--maximizing
the joint gains from transactions.
The second difference relates to the classicists' belief in the ineluctability of legal rules. Classicism
taught that judges should apply common law doctrines with relentless logic, without allowing for exceptions based upon new social propositions or the
harshness of particular results. 17 For example, classical contract law held that promises lacking consideration were unenforceable.' Gift promises lacked consideration; as a result, a court should not enforce a
gift promise, even in circumstances where the promisee reasonably had relied on the promise to his or
her detriment. People might recoil at the idea of a
promisee bearing the loss in these circumstances, but
a court could not ignore the rule about gift promises
simply because the rule led to a harsh or unfair result
in a particular case. Just as classicists denied the role
of real-world concerns in the formulation of legal
rules, they denied the role of real-world concerns in
16

Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Con-

tractLaw, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 547 (2003).
'7 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1752-53 (criticizing this aspect of classical legal
reasoning).
181 draw this example from Eisenberg. See id.
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the application of rules as well.
By contrast, New Formalists believe that legal rules
have merely presumptive force. 19 When pragmatic or
ethical considerations counsel strongly against the
application of a rule in a particular case, a court
should not insist on applying the rule. For example,
Frederick Schauer endorses a "new" version of formalism that he calls "presumptive positivism." 20 Under this approach, legal rules create "presumptive
rather than absolute" constraints for courts,
"thereby... allowing for the possibility of override in
particularly exigent circumstances." 2 1 Similarly,
Randy Barnett's "consent theory" of contract relies
heavily on presumptions in explaining the proper limits of objective interpretation and the role of contract
defenses. While the parties' consent makes out a
prima facie case of contractual obligation, Barnett
argues, the case may be rebutted by a showing of circumstances, generally coterminous with traditional
its
contract defenses, that deprive that consent "of
22
normal moral, and therefore legal, significance."
Third, the classicists' defense of freedom of con9

1 See Grey, supra note 3, at 499 (discussing "presumptive" nature of contem-

porary formalism).
"FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 197, 203 (1991). See also
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 546-48 (1988) (discussing
"presumptive formalism" and suggesting it be called "presumptive positivism").
21
SCHAUER, supra note 20, at 196.
22
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269,
318 (1986).
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tract allegedly sets them apart from New Formalists.
Here again, the conventional wisdom draws a distinction between the essentialism of classical contract law
and the pragmatism of contemporary scholarship. According to the conventional wisdom, classicists held
that freedom of contract was a conceptual imperative,
a principle that followed necessarily from a true understanding of contract's nature. 23 This essentialism
supposedly led classicists to reject all limits on party
autonomy, even limits based on health and safety
grounds--to endorse the Supreme Court's holding, in
the landmark case of Lochner v. New York,24 that the
Constitution prohibits legislation that interferes with
parties' right to contract on terms they see fit. 25 The
association with Lochner casts a reactionary taint on
the classicists, and in fact some scholars have suggested that their essentialism masked an antiegalitarian bias. For example, Morton Horwitz writes
that Williston's objectivism acted to "disguise gross
disparities of bargaining power under a fagade of neutral and formal rules. ' '2 6
By contrast, contemporary defenses of freedom of
contract tend to rely on functional arguments. Most of
these defenses come from the law and economics per23See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 2, at 1133 (discussing the "classical, conceptualist
ethic emphasizing... 'freedom of contract' and marketplace economics").
24
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
25See Grey, supra note 3, at 494-96 (discussing the "canonical" connection
between
Langdellism and Lochnerism).
26
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 17801860, at 201 (1977).
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spective and stress the efficiency gains that result
from honoring party autonomy. 27 Contracts increase
efficiency by allowing parties to trade goods and services to other parties who value them more highly. As
a result, society generally should refrain from interfering with parties' contractual choices; society can
better address distributional concerns through tax and
transfer measures. Law and economics scholarship
does accept regulations that weed out contracts that
do not reflect real choice (contracts based on deception or threats, for example) as well as contracts that
involve some market failure, such as the presence of
externalities. Generally speaking, though, most law
and economics scholars hold that the efficiency losses
that result from broader limitations on party autonomy outweigh the benefits.
One important strand of law and economics scholarship addresses freedom of contract from the point
of view of institutional competence. This scholarship
also relies on pragmatic arguments. For example, Michael Trebilcock, a Canadian whose work has been
influential in the United States, dismisses abstract
inquiries into the proper scope of party autonomy.28
Such inquiries involve the balancing of a multitude of
conflicting social values and are thus likely to be unsuccessful. Rather, scholars should focus on a more
27See F. H. Buckley, Introduction, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 1, 7 (F. H. Buckley ed., 1999) ("[T]he intellectual revival of freedom
of contract has been led by scholars in the law-and-economics tradition.").
28
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 248
(1993).
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practical question: determining which government
actor seems most likely to reach an appropriate balance among these many social values. For example,
Trebilcock writes, courts typically lack the information and expertise necessary to engage in a sensitive
evaluation of social conditions. As a result, courts
typically should refrain from invalidating private
transactions on the basis of wider social values.
Regulators, by contrast, are more likely to have "an
appropriately systemic perspective." 29 They are thus
better equipped than courts to identify those market
failures, such as information asymmetries and collective-action problems, that may justify invalidating
certain private agreements.
Finally, in today's terms, classical scholarship
seems strikingly under-theorized. A good example is
the work of Williston. Like other classical scholars,
Williston devoted himself primarily to doctrinal
analysis--to the identification and development of the
principles that underlie judicial decisions and, to a
lesser extent, commercial statutes."a Williston's work
was not merely descriptive; he sought connections
among doctrines, criticized incoherence, and suggested ways to harmonize apparently inconsistent
precedents. But apart from occasional references to
common sense and other intuitive notions, policy arguments did not interest him. Williston largely ig29
301d. at

251.

Cf Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1314,
1316 (2002) (describing traditional legal scholarship).
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nored big-picture questions about the political and
economic goals of contract law; he did not look to
other disciplines to gain a deeper understanding of
the legal system. Moreover, he showed little inclination to do empirical work on the complex ways in
which legal rules might interact with commercial
practice. "[F]rom the standpoint of legal or social
thought," Lawrence Friedman laments, Williston's
work amounted to "volume after volume of a heavy
void. 3 1
By contrast, contemporary formalism seeks a
stronger theoretical foundation. Straightforward doctrinal analysis does not appeal to New Formalists;
they care much more about explaining the legal regime in terms of functional utility. Moreover, when
they make claims about formalism's practical benefits, New Formalists do not rely on commonsense
intuitions. Rather, they back their assertions with sophisticated economic models and empirical studies.
For example, in defending objective contract interpre32
tation, Schwartz and Scott rely on microeconomics.
Bernstein, for her part, has conducted a number of
empirical studies of private arbitral regimes that show
how a combination of formalist adjudication and informal reputational 33sanctions can serve the needs of
contracting parties.
31LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 543
(1973).
32See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 16, at
548.
33See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 14, at 1735-45 (discussing cotton arbitrators);

Lisa Bernstein, Merchant LawnIn a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search For Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1769-71
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Some classical scholarship no doubt fits the image
that New Formalists have of it. 34 But some does not.
For example, Samuel Williston's work has more nuance and balance, and shows more continuity with
contemporary scholarship, than commonly supposed.
Williston taught at Harvard for about 60 years, starting in 1890. Over the course of his career, he wrote
more than 50 articles and several treatises on commercial law, including an influential contracts treatise, Williston on Contracts, which appeared in
1920. 3 ' He drafted several important commercial statutes and served as Reporter on the Restatement of
Contracts, a monumental project, sponsored by the
American Law Institute, which synthesized American
contract law in 1932.36 His impact on American contract law has been enormous and enduring.
Williston's work thus represents an influential
strand of classical contract jurisprudence. 37 Yet his
(1996) (discussing feed and grain arbitrators).
341 should point out that some new scholarship rejects the idea that classicists
were reductive. See, e.g., David M. Rabban, The Historiographyof Late Nineteenth-Century American Legal History, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW
541, 541-42, 546 (2003).
35
SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920).
This treatise is
currently in its fourth edition. RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS

(4th
36

ed. 1990).

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932).

37

Some might argue that the differences between Williston and other classicists
suggest that Williston should not be considered a classical formalist at all. But
the differences are not so pronounced as to exclude Williston from the classical
camp. While Williston did not share the conceptualism of the Langdellians, he
did agree on other central tenets of classicism, for example, the desirability of
abstract rules and the importance of logic in legal reasoning. His scholarship,
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work does not wholly fit the image of tiresome scribbling that ignores all social concerns. When one actually takes the time to read Williston, one sees that the
conventional image presents an incomplete picture.
While much of his scholarship can strike a contemporary reader as arid and conceptual, there are strong
elements of pragmatism as well. Williston tempered
an emphasis on formal logic with a concern for the
real-world effects of legal rules, an advocacy of economic individualism with a recognition of the need
for some market regulation.
I have studied Williston's work in detail elsewhere. 38 Here, I will briefly discuss three important
ways in which Williston's jurisprudence shows more
subtlety than we typically appreciate. First, Williston's formalism was not essentialist. True, he favored
the use of abstract principles in legal reasoning. But
he did not favor abstract principles because of their
coherence with a "correct" conceptual understanding
of contract. Law, he wrote, "is a pragmatic science,"
one that must be judged by its real-world application. 39 Williston favored formal legal reasoning because he believed that it had important practical advantages.
like other classical scholarship, was systematic and doctrinal. These points of
agreement demonstrate that, despite his rejection of essentialism, Williston is
best seen as part of the classical tradition in contract law.
38Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207
(2005).
39
SAMUEL WILLISTON, SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW 127 (photo
reprint 1986) (1929).
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For example, Williston argued that general legal
concepts promote predictability in commercial relationships. If law were merely a collection of particularized rules without unifying principles, lawyers
could not accurately advise clients. 4 1 Parties could
not feel secure about their contractual rights and duties and might be less likely to enter into mutually
beneficial agreements. Moreover, uncertainty would
promote costly litigation that would drain the resources of the parties and the public at large. Williston frequently pointed out that the success of a legal
system depended not only on its capacity to reach
acceptable results at trial, but also its capacity to delineate rights and duties without the need for litigation.42
Williston recognized that there was a potential
practical downside to the use of general concepts in
law. Categorical principles could lead to harsh results
in particular cases.4 3 But he believed that this danger
was exaggerated. 44 Legal complexity also could cause
hardship, for example, by creating traps for the unwary or opportunities for sharp practice. By adhering
40

Samuel Williston, Change in the Law, 69 U.S. L. REv. 237, 239 (1935) (dis"systematic jurisprudence").

cussing
41

SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW 213 (1941)

(discussing difficulty of

learning and applying a body of law that lacks "connecting threads of principile" ).
See, e.g., Samuel Williston, Repudiation of Contracts (Part11),
14 HARv. L.
REv.
421,438 (1901).
43
See, e.g., WILLISTON, supra note 39, at 2-3.
441d.at 97.
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to general concepts, judges could reduce these potential dangers. Moreover, categorical principles could
help rein in willful judges who might be inclined to
decide a matter on the basis of personal whim rather
than "the general justice of the case." 45 In any event,
as discussed below, Williston believed that legal rules
should have only presumptive effect; in particularly
exigent circumstances, judges should refrain from
applying them.
Williston's pragmatism was also evident in the way
he derived the general principles themselves. Williston did not often describe his methodology, but one
can piece it together from his occasional jurisprudential writings and from the corpus of his work. Williston did not attempt to derive the principles of contract
law from metaphysical philosophy. Such an approach
would be a waste of time, he thought--"an excursion
into cloud-land.",4 6 Rather, he looked to case law. Judicial decisions provided the raw materials for his
systematic jurisprudence.
Williston believed that a scholar must study a body
of case law and identify "the principles, whether
clearly formulated or not... which underlie the decisions." 47 In a largely inductive process, the scholar
must observe the data--that is, read the cases--and,
45

1d. at 59.

46WILLISTON, supra note 41, at 203.
47
Samuel Williston, The Necessity of Idealism in Teaching Law, 2 AM. L.
SCHOOL REV. 201, 202 (1908).
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reasoning upward, discover the general principles that
the data reflected. 4 8 Once identified, the principles
served as a kind of canon by which one could judge
the correctness of the cases themselves. Sound cases
conformed to the principles; unsound cases did not.
Williston captured this idea in a phrase he often repeated: "stare principiis."4 9 Although courts should
generally follow precedent in the interests of stability,
wrong decisions ultimately should not stand in the
way of sound principles.
Nonetheless, Williston did not believe that a
scholar could identify legal concepts solely through
induction. Various "principled" accounts of doctrine
could exist. The scholar had to develop the best account: the one that relied on concepts that were general, uniform, consistent with the body of law as a
whole, and, crucially, in tune with real-world needs.
Williston made this point repeatedly. The ideal rule,
he wrote in 1908, should not "violate sound views of
political economy;" it should "conform to the usages
or requirements of business.' 50 Similarly, in a 1935
article entitled Change in the Law, Williston insisted
that a legal principle should not only be general and
coherent, but "should also conform to social needs
48

See Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1387, 1434 (1997) (explaining that classicists believed that the "axiomatic principles of the common
law... were to be initially discovered by reasoning inductively upward from the
cases").
49
See, e.g., Williston, supra note 40, at 239.
50
Williston, supra note 47, at 202.
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and not violate what may be called the mores of the
community."'" Indeed, because "social needs" and
"mores" change over time, legal principles must
themselves evolve. "To the extent that social needs
and mores change, legal principles should change"
too. 52

In this embrace of pragmatism, Williston resembled
today's New Formalists. Of course, one should not
overstate the similarities. Williston focused primarily
on doctrinal system-building; he did not give policy
arguments nearly the same degree of attention as
black-letter analysis. Moreover, compared to New
Formalists, Williston was noticeably under-theorized.
Williston did not attempt to support his assertions
about practical benefits with empirical data or sophisticated economic models. Even his concept of stare
principiis was more or less intuitive. Williston never
attempted to develop a theory that would explain
when, precisely, a court should abandon precedent in
favor of correct principle. 53 Nonetheless, both in defending an axiomatic jurisprudence and in deriving
the axioms themselves, Williston emphasized realworld benefits, not conformity to abstract philosophy
or adherence to judicial fiat.
Second, like New Formalists, Williston understood
that a rule should not control in circumstances where
51
5

Williston, supra note 40, at 239.
Id
See Grey, supra note 5, at 26.

2

53

[132]
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its application would lead to seriously bad social consequences. In explaining this belief, Williston drew a
distinction between geometric logic and legal logic, a
distinction that will surprise people who hold the conventional view of him. Geometric logic, Williston
wrote, is conclusive; its "'arguments aim at demonstrative certainty'."' 54 Legal logic, by contrast, is a
matter of "[p]resumptions and probabilities;" 5 5 it indicates the likely result, at least in the absence of serious practical difficulties. So, for example, when one
Realist scholar quipped that formal logic was so indeterminate that it could not even definitively resolve a
dispute whether "Socrates is mortal,, 56 Williston answered him thus:
If we can say, almost all men are mortal,
though occasionally one may be found
who is not, the judicial conclusion in a
particular case is likely to be that Socrates is mortal unless it can be shown that
there are some peculiar circumstances in
the facts of his case rendering the rule
that applies to most men inapplicable to
him. A great deal of legal and judicial
reasoning is like that."
Thus, like New Formalists, Williston maintained
54

See WILLISTON, supra note 39, at 157 n.2 (internal reference omitted).

"Id.
at 157.
6
1d. at 153-54.
"Id.at 156-57.
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that rules should have merely presumptive force: in
an appropriate case, logic should take a back seat to
"practical convenience" and rough justice. 58 "No one
will dispute," Williston wrote, "that logic should be
the servant not the master of practical convenience,
and that where logic and convenience are clearly at
war, logic must yield." 5 9 Of course, deciding precisely when logic and convenience are clearly at war
is a matter of judgment; given the advantages that he
believed logic created for a legal system, Williston
thought that courts should depart from logic only on
the strongest arguments from social policy. 60 But in
"law
the end, social welfare, not logic, must control:
61
is made for man, and not man for the law."
Third, Williston distrusted conceptual defenses of
laissez-faire capitalism. 62 As a pragmatist, Williston
understood that freedom of contract could not be the
only public value, that law had to strike a balance
between party autonomy and other social concerns
like public health and safety. To be sure, Williston
did not think that courts should attempt to strike this
58WILLISTON, supra note 41, at 311; see Williston, supra note 42, at 438 ("It

may be conceded that practical convenience is of more importance than logical
exactness .... "). I discuss several examples of Williston's preference for
presumptive rules, including his embrace of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, in Movsesian, supra note 38, at 245-53.
9
Samuel Williston, Book Review, 35 HARV. L. REv. 220, 221 (1921).
6
°See Williston, supra note 41, at 438 (arguing that "considerations of practical
convenience must be very weighty to justify infringing the underlying princi1les of the law of contracts").
1 WILLISTON, supra note 35, § 119, at 256.
62See Grey, supra note 3, at 502 (stating that "Williston gave no support to
constitutional liberty of contract") (internal quotations omitted).
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balance; he did not think judges should have discretion to settle broad social questions in the context of
particular cases. 63 Yet he did not object to legislative
attempts to ameliorate the harshness of the free market. Indeed, he occasionally drafted such legislation
himself.
Williston's thoughts on the matter appear most
clearly in his remarkable article, Freedom of Contract, which he wrote in 1921.64 Given the conventional wisdom about classicism, one might expect a
full-throated defense of libertarianism in contract
law. In fact, Williston devoted much of the piece to
debunking the notion of absolute liberty of contract.
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, he explained, "metaphysical and political philosophers" had preached "a gospel of freedom" and
laissez-faire economics. 65 This "theorizing" had made
a strong impact on American contract law, which had
adopted extremely individualistic doctrines about parto make agreements free from state
ties' capacity
66
regulation.
By the twentieth century, however, the "tide" had
turned against freedom of contract, and Williston
WILLISTON, supra note 41, at 215 (discussing judicial temptation to
make exceptions "to avoid a harsh application of a general rule").
64Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365 (1921).
61Id. at 366.
66See id. at 367 (describing the effect of laissez-faire philosophy on the development of contract law).
63See
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plainly favored the direction of the change. 67 Experience had shown, he wrote, "that unlimited freedom of
contract, like unlimited freedom in other directions,
does not necessarily lead to public or individual welfare." ' 68 Legislatures must balance the legitimate
claims of party autonomy against other social interests like public health and safety. Once legislatures
had done so, courts should stay out of the way. Williston denounced the Lochner Court's willingness to
obstruct "reasonable social experiment[s] ' ' 69 and gave
a list of salutary laws that might once have offended
notions of liberty of contract, but fortunately did so
no longer: rate regulations for common carriers, statutes providing standard terms in insurance contracts,
limitations on interest rates that creditors could
charge "the necessitous poor,",70 and even minimum
wage laws. 7
As Freedom of Contract demonstrates, Williston's
approach to the concept was both pragmatic and institutional: pragmatic in its recognition that freedom of
contract must be balanced against other social interests and institutional in its focus on assigning the balancing to the correct governmental actor. This approach resonates with at least some of the current
law-and-economics literature on party autonomy,
67

See id. at 374-75 (discussing situations where unlimited freedom of contract
does not serve the public interest).
68ld
69
1d. at 376.
7
°Id. at 375.
7'For discussion of these examples and others, see id at 374-75, 377-78.
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most notably Trebilcock's work, discussed earlier. To
be sure, Williston's argument is not as theoretically
rich as Trebilcock's. Unlike Trebilcock, Williston did
not offer a careful comparison of the perspectives of
judges and legislators; he did not explain public regulation in terms of information asymmetries and other
market failures. Nonetheless, his approach is quite
close in spirit to Trebilcock's, and the affinities
should make us wary of dismissing Williston's arguments as excessively conceptual.
Williston's moderation appears, not only in jurisprudential articles like Freedom of Contract, but also
in his work as a statutory drafter. No concept so typifies freedom of contract as caveat emptor, the doctrine that holds that courts will not intervene to rescue
buyers who have not taken reasonable steps to protect
themselves. Given the conventional wisdom about
classicism, one would expect Williston to have enshrined the doctrine in the statutes he drafted. But his
statutory work demonstrates uneasiness with caveat
emptor. One important example involves the provision he wrote for the American Uniform Sales Act on
a buyer's remedies for a seller's breach of warranty.
Suppose that a buyer has purchased defective goods
from a seller who had warranted their quality. Established law at the time Williston drafted the Sales Act
provided that the buyer could keep the goods and sue
the seller for damages, measured as the difference in
value between the goods as warranted and the goods
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as delivered.7 2 If the seller had known about the defects, established law also gave the buyer the option
to rescind the sale, return the goods, and recover the
purchase price. 73 But what if the seller had not known
about the defects? The English Sale of Goods Act,
which served as Williston's principal model, did not
allow the buyer to rescind the contract in those circumstances. American jurisdictions were divided on
the question, 74 though the weight of authority apparently favored the English rule. 75
A drafter who favored an unmitigated right to contract easily could have adopted the English rule for
the American statute. But Williston did not adopt the
English rule. Instead, he drafted a provision for the
Sales Act that allowed rescission even where the
seller's misrepresentation had been innocent. 76 He
argued that a buyer's right to rescind in these circumstances would create practical advantages. For example, allowing rescission for honest as well as fraudulent misrepresentation would save litigation costs by
obviating the need for difficult and time consuming
inquiries about the77 seller's state of mind when he
gave the warranty.
72

SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON
LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT § 608, at 1009 (1909).
73

1d. at 1010; see also WILLISTON, supra note 41, at 260-61 (discussing this
hypothetical).
WILLISTON, supra note 72, § 608, at 1011.
75
Samuel Williston, Rescission for Breach of Warranty, 4 COLUM. L. REv.
195, 211 (1904).
76
Unif Sales Act § 69(1)(d), I U.L.A. 295 (1950).
77WILLISTON, supra note 72, § 608, at 1010-11.
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More importantly, Williston believed that the rescission remedy promoted commercial good faith.
Williston did not feel comfortable leaving parties entirely to fend for themselves in the marketplace. He
thought that law should step in when one party sought
to take unfair advantage of the other. Williston explained his reasoning thus:
The remedy of rescission, if allowed at
all, is allowed on broad principles of justice. The basis of the remedy is that the
buyer has not bought what he bargained
for. The desirability of such a remedy
depends purely on the business customs
of a community and on whether it appeals to the natural sense of justice. Do
merchants who value their reputation for
fair dealing take back goods which they
have untruthfully, though innocently, asserted possessed particular qualities? Do
reasonable buyers who have bought
goods under such circumstances expect
the seller to take back the goods and refund the price[?] These are the essential
inquiries, and there can be little doubt of
the answers... The morality of taking advantage afterward of false statements innocently made, by insisting on retaining
the advantage of a sale induced thereby,
is almost as questionable as that of making knowingly false statements to bring
[US GENTIUM" Volume 12
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about the sale."8
In the end, Williston wrote, the English rule represented nothing more than "the principle of caveat
emptor."79 As a result, the English rule "may well be
applicaswept away, as the more obviously barbarous
80
tions of the doctrine have already been."
In his rejection of essentialism, his embrace of presumptive formalism, and his pragmatic approach to
freedom of contract, Williston stands much closer to
contemporary formalism than we commonly assume.
There is, however, one sense in which Williston's
work does fit the conventional picture of classical
jurisprudence. Compared to New Formalists, Williston was dramatically under-theorized. Where New
Formalists rely on empirical data and sophisticated
economic models to support their doctrinal prescriptions, Williston made only shorthand references to
concerns about rough justice and "practical convenience." 8 1 The under-theorized character of Williston's
scholarship comes through in two examples I have
already discussed here: his rather vague concept of
stare principiis,and his rejection of caveat emptor as
a violation of roughly defined norms of commercial
good faith. There are many others that I have disat 1010.
'Id.
79Samuel Williston, Rescissionfor Breach of Warranty, 16 HARv. L. REv. 465,
(1903).
8475
0
1d.
8
'See, e.g., Williston, supra note 42, at 438.
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82

cussed elsewhere.
Williston's penchant for abbreviated policy arguments, his tendency to describe the effect of legal
rules in intuitive terms, can strike a contemporary
academic reader as unsophisticated, even banal. We
are accustomed to richer accounts, both normative
and positive, of legal rules and their operation. Unlike
Williston, most scholars today would not think it sufficient to defend doctrine, or explain its effect in the
real world, by making shorthand references to undefined notions of "justice" and "practical convenience." Williston's repeated reliance on such vague
concepts, his use of common sense as a method of
legal reasoning, makes him seem thoughtless and unambitious--a failure, for all his success in formulating
a doctrinal system.
One should not be too quick to dismiss Williston
and other classicists on this basis, however. Success
or failure depends on what a scholar is trying to
achieve. Before one can judge a body of scholarship,
one needs to understand the scholar's goals and intended audience. The goals of classical scholars differed greatly from those of contemporary scholars.
Today, American law professors think of themselves
as writing primarily for other academics. Their task,
as they perceive it, is to formulate new accounts of
law and law's social impact and to defend those ac82

Movsesian, supra note 38, at 262-67. Williston's more or less intuitive defense of the parol evidence rule offers a particularly interesting example. See
id. at 266-67.
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counts within the scholarly community. 83 Rather than
as adjuncts to the bar, they see themselves principally

as members of the broader university world; indeed,
they increasingly attempt to map law in terms of
other disciplines like economics and political science.84 They write in an academic idiom, one that
prizes theoretical novelty and rigor and argumentative

subtlety.
Williston and other classicists understood the enterprise of legal scholarship quite differently. They
did not direct their work primarily toward other law
professors (given the relatively small number of
American law schools at the time, that would have

been a narrow readership indeed) but toward practicing professionals. 85 They believed that their most im-

portant task as scholars consisted of creating a doctrinal system that attorneys and businesspeople could
use on an everyday basis, one that simplified law and
made it more comprehensible. 86 They saw them83

See Posner, supra note 30, at 1321; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: Interdisciplinarity,100 MICH. L. REV. 1217, 1217 (2002).
84See Posner, supra note 30, at 1321-22 (discussing law-and-economics and
contemporary constitutional law scholarship); Sullivan, supra note 83, at 1217
(discussing the "law-and" phenomenon); see also TAMANAHA, supra note 5,
ch. 8 (discussing increasingly academic, as opposed to practical, orientation of
law professors).
"See Posner, supra note 30, at 1320 (discussing traditional legal scholarship's
emphasis on writing for the legal profession); see also Sullivan, supra note 83,
at 1217 (discussing changes in legal scholarship).
"See, e.g., WILLISTON, supra note 41, at 108 ("It is also part of a teacher's
work to a greater or less extent to systematize the law..."); Samuel Williston,
Fashions in Law with Illustrationsfrom the Law of Contracts, 21 TEX. L. REV.
119, 133 (1942) (discussing classical legal scholarship); Williston, supra note
40, at 238-39 (discussing classical legal pedagogy).
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selves, not so much as participants in the university
world, but as members of the bar.87 Late in his career, remembering his early Harvard colleagues, Williston gave a description that could apply to him as
well. His colleagues, he recalled, "did not conceive of
themselves as jurists, but as lawyers.... They felt
themselves engaged in a practical profession, and in
the training of young men ' 8for
that profession. As
8
such, they were pragmatists."
Given their goals and intended audience, the classicists' reliance on intuitive justifications seems more
plausible. Lawyers rely on rough judgments about
fairness and practicality all the time. So do their clients. Even if "business people" do not carefully reason out legal problems, Williston maintained, "they
89
do have an instinct" about their proper resolution.
Lawyers and their clients work with law on an operational level, and they typically have little interest in
rich theoretical accounts. 9" Particularly in the commercial context, complex and controversial normative
accounts of law can have a negative payoff. As Richard Posner has argued, everyday commerce depends
on the ability of parties to displace debates about
"deep issues" that can "disrupt and even poison
7
" As Richard Posner notes, legal scholars traditionally "identified with the legal
profession rather than with their colleagues in other departments of their university. They even dressed like lawyers rather than like professors." Posner,
supra note 30, at 1315.
88WILLISTON, supra note 39, at 119.

89SAMUEL WILLISTON, PROBLEMS IN THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 22

(1933).
9

RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 11-12 (2003).
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' 91
commercial relations among strangers."

In the end, the differences between classical and
contemporary formalism do not relate so much to essentialism, or pragmatism, or moderation with respect
to freedom of contract. As Williston's work shows,
some influential classicists actually agreed with New
Formalists on these matters--or, at least, agreed to a
greater extent than we typically realize. The differences relate more to the changing self-image of
American law professors, who increasingly define
themselves as university scholars first and lawyers
second, often a far second. People who view themselves as social scientists are not likely to spend their
careers parsing judicial decisions and building doctrinal superstructures; they are not likely to value the
intuitive judgments of practitioners.
The new orientation of American legal scholarship
presents both promise and threat. Much of the new
scholarship is rich and suggestive. Very few of us, I
suspect, would like to return to the days of classical
jurisprudence, when law reviews were filled with articles endlessly distinguishing and reconciling cases.
Nonetheless, there is a danger that, in attempting to
employ the tools of other disciplines, we will come to
disregard our own comparative advantage as experts
trained in law and legal institutions and our obligation to help prepare our students for the world of the
professional lawyer. Whether the potential promise of
91

1d at
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the new scholarship outweighs the potential threat,
however, is a matter for another symposium.
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